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A Constitutional Perspective
on the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act
In the spring of 1975 the Indiana legislature enacted a compre-
hensive malpractice compensation act' in response to the "malpractice
crisis,"2 the symptoms of which include escalating damage awards,
rapidly rising premiums on malpractice insurance, and increasing public
concern that the quality of medical care is being harmed by the traditional
tort litigation process.'
1 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1 to -9-10 (Burns Supp. 1975) [hereinafter referred to as the
Malpractice Act or the Act].2 See generally Introduction: The Indiana Act in Context, 51 IND. L.J. 91 (1975),
supra.3 See Cast, Indiand's Medical Liability Problem, 68 J. or IND. ST. MED. ASS'N 21, 21-23
(1975); President's Page, id. at 34; Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Jan. 13, 1975,
at 1; id., Jan. 14, 1975, at 1.
However, some authorities indicate that the problem is not the result of the fault
system, but rather the result of the medical profession's failure to police its own ranks.
See, e.g., Walkup & Kelly, Hospital Liability: Changing Patterns of Responsibility, 8 U.
SAN FAN. L. Rxv. 247, 260 (1973).
Strong impetus for a change in the Indiana law arose in the fall of 1974 when the
state's two largest malpractice insurers, Medical Protective Company and St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Company, refused to renew existing policies of physicians in high-risk
categories, such as neurosurgery, obstetrics, and anesthesiology. At the same time, those
companies refused to issue liability policies to new practitioners in the state. The conse-
quences of these actions were immediately apparent. Physicians, in many cases, were un-
able to obtain insurance elsewhere, and this in turn resulted in the near-suspension of all
but emergency surgery at several hospitals. Simultanously, the premiums for available mal-
practice insurance were reaching new heights. Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Jan.
13, 1975, at 1; id., Jan. 14, 1975, at 1; Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, Nov. 14, 1974, at lB.
Alarmed by these events, the Indiana State Medical Association, at its annual meeting
in October 1974, appointed a special committee to study the malpractice insurance dilemma
and make recommendations for solution. The committee's recommendation, approved by
the Association's Board of Trustees, was corrective legislation. Subsequently, three Indi-
anapolis attorneys were employed by the Association to draft a "Patients' Compensation
Act." See H.R. 1460, 99th Ind. Gen. Assembly (1975).
The primary provision of the initial bill involved substitution of a physician-layman-
attorney arbitration board for the traditional jury trial of liability and damage issues.
Moreover, the measure contained a scheduled limitation of compensatory damages to a
ceiling of $125,000, exclusive of costs and attorney fees. In addition, the bill reduced the
statute of limitations for minors, established a sliding scale for attorneys' contingent fees,
and required health care providers who wished to obtain the bill's benefits to file proof of
financial responsibility of at least $125,000.
Variations on the Patients' Compensation Act were also introduced during the 1975
session of the legislature. One proposal retained the traditional tort liability approach to
malpractice, but provided that awards over $200,000 would be paid from a patients' com-
pensation fund, established by a compulsory $500 per year assessment on each physician
in the state. A second proposal would have amended the Patients' Compensation Act by
requiring malpractice insurers in the state to set rates based solely on claim experience
among Indiana health care providers.
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The Malpractice Act makes several significant changes in the tort-
based system of malpractice compensation.' The Act:
1) limits the total amount of a plaintiff's recovery to a $500,000
maximum ;'
2) limits the liability of each health care provider to $100,000 ;'
3) provides that any amount due from a judgment or settlement
in excess of the total liability of all liable health care providers shall
be payable from a patients' compensation fund, in an amount to be
determined by "the court" in which the action is pending, or if no action
is pending, in the circuit or superior court of Marion County ;'
4) re-enacts the two-year statute of limitations for malpractice
and makes it applicable regardless of legal disability, with the exception
that malpractice victims younger than six will have until the age of
eight to bring suit;'
5) establishes a "patients' compensation fund" to pay any amount
due for a judgment or settlement which is in excess of the total liability
of all health care providers ;"
While the bill was pending in the Indiana Senate, the Medical Malpractice Committee
of the Indiana Bar Association issued a report and conclusions based upon its own investi-
gation of the problem. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE COMMITTEE 8 (1975) [on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL]. The committee
recommended retaining the jury system for determination of liability and pain and suffer-
ing damages, but proposed that other damages be determined by a judge. The committee
agreed with the sponsors of the Patients' Compensation Act that a ceiling should be set on
damages, but recommended that a plaintiff whose experience showed that an award for
maintenance and future expenses was inadequate be allowed to reapply to the court for
additional funds.
4 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, Appendix at 217-23 (1973), for an analysis of the
traditional tort litigation process, and James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q.
582, 599-605 (1956), for a discussion of damages traditionally awardable in personal in-
jury actions.
' IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1975).
6IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(b) (Burns Supp. 1975).
The term "health care providers" is defined in the Act:
"Health care provider" means a person, corporation, facility or institution licensed
by this state to provide health care or professional services as a physician, hospital,
dentist, registered or licensed practical nurse, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor,
physical therapist or psychologist, or an officer, employee or agent thereof acting
in the course and scope of his employment.
IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1(a) (Burns Supp. 1975).
Under the Act, for example, plaintiff who recovered a $500,000 verdict against a phy-
sician and a hospital could recover at most $100,000 of that sum from the physician and
$100,000 from the hospital. The remaining $300,000 would be paid by the patients' com-
pensation fund. See note 7 infra and text accompanying.7 
IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5-2-2(c), 16-9.5-4-3 (Burns Supp. 1975).
8 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 to -2 (Bums Supp. 1975).
"IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(c) (Burns Supp. 1975). The fund is to be financed by an
annual surcharge of not more than 10 percent of each health care provider's insurance pre-
mium. See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-4-1(b) (Burns Supp. 1975).
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6) requires a plaintiff to submit his claim to a "medical review
panel" prior to commencement of a court action; *
7) provides that any member of the review panel may be required
to testify at the behest of either party;"
8) limits to 15 percent an attorney's share of any recovery from
the patients' compensation fund;"2 and
9) initiates a state-run insurance plan for otherwise uninsurable
health care providers. 3
The effect of these provisions on the volume of malpractice litigation
and the magnitude of damage awards cannot presently be ascertained.
Some provisions of the Malpractice Act, however, may be subject to
challenge on constitutional grounds. The statute may violate due
process, 4 the right to jury trial,'5 and equal protection.' 6
Under the due process clause,' 7 legislation must address a legitimate
state objective, and it is clear that the Act does so. However, courts
have sometimes inquired whether legislation altering common law
10 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-1 to -10 (Burns Supp. 1975). The panel is obligated to render
an opinion as to the following questions:
(1) Whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or defendants
failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the
complaint;
(2) Whether the conduct complained of was or was not a factor of the resultant
damages, and if so, whether the plaintiff suffered any disability or permanent
impairment and the extent of such; and
(3) Whether there is a material issue of fact, not requiring expert opinion, bearing
on liability for consideration by the court or jury.
bw. CODE § 16-9.5-9-7 (Burns Supp. 1975).
" IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-9 (Burns Supp. 1975).
12 IsD. CODE § 16-9.5-5-1(a) (Burns Supp. 1975). Statutory limits on attorneys' fees
have been upheld as constitutional exercises of the state's police power. See, e.g., Yeiser v.
Dysart, 267 U.S. 540 (1925); Buckler v. Hilt, 209 Ind. 541, 200 N.E. 219 (1936) (work-
men's compensation laws).
13 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-8-1 to -8 (Burns Supp. 1975).
In addition, the Act:
1) requires that a contract by a health care provider which guarantees specific results from
medical treatment be evidenced by a writing before suit can be brought on such a con-
tract. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-4 (Burns Supp. 1975).
2) requires that every claim settled or adjudicated to final judgment against any health
care provider be reported to the state commission of insurance and to the health care
provider's board of professional registration and examination. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-6-1
to -2 (Burns Supp. 1975).
3) creates a "Medical Malpractice Study Commission" to execute a comprehensive analysis
of the entire malpractice problem and report to the legislative council and the governor
by December 31, 1976. Pub. L. No. 146, § 2 [19751 1 Ind. Acts 854, 867.
4) provides for severability of the provisions of the Act so that the invalidity of one por-
tion will not affect other unconnected portions. Pub. L. No. 146, § 4 [1975] 1 Ind.
Acts 854, 869.
14 See text accompanying note 31 infra.
15See text accompanying note 62 infra.
16 See text accompanying note 106 infra.
17 U.S. CoNsT. amend. xiv; IND. CoNST. art. 1, § 12.
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rights provides the plaintiff with a "reasonable substitute" for those
rights. Under the standards which the courts have developed, the Mal-
practice Act does not provide a "reasonable substitute" for pre-existent
rights. On the other hand, it is not clear that a "reasonable substitute"
is required by the due process clause.
The Act redistributes from jury to judge the power to measure
damages recoverable from the patients' compensation fund. 8 There
is evidence that the assessment of damages was a fundamental element
of the common law jury trial. The Act is therefore open to challenge
on the grounds that it denies the plaintiff's constitutional right to jury
trial.'9
Finally, the Malpractice Act may be challenged on equal protection
grounds.2 ° The Act establishes two classifications which may be arbi-
trary. First, its provisions apply to those injured by malpractice but
not to those otherwise injured. Second, its damage limit may deny full
recovery to malpractice victims who have suffered extensive objectively
identifiable damages, as well as to victims who claim extensive pain and
suffering damages. The first classification may be too narrow in sweep,
the second too broad.
Comparison to "No-Fault" and Workmen's Compensation Acts
Throughout this note the Malpractice Act will be compared to
workmen's compensation laws and to "no-fault" automobile reparation
statutes. These major legislative inroads upon the tort litigation process
have been the subject of intense constitutional scrutiny.
Most workmen's compensation laws place some ceiling on damage
awards. Some workmen's compensation acts set a maximum limit on
total recovery,2 while others establish a schedule of payments limiting
the recovery for each of several types of injury.22 Unlike most work-
men's compensation acts, which at least allow an injured individual to
recover in full for all medical expenses,23 the Malpractice Act limits the
total recovery regardless of the type of damage suffered.24 Moreover,
'8 See IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5-2-2(c), 16-9.5-4-3 (Burns Supp. 1975).
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. vii; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12.20 U.S. CONST. amend. xiv; IND. CoNST. art. 1, § 23.
21 See, e.g., 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 58.00-.11 (1975).
22 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-3-3-22 (Burns 1974).
23 For a general discussion of the new cause of action created by the workmen's com-
pensation statutes, and its basis in an obligation owed the worker by industry, see BY.
SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS OF INDIANA § 1.1 (1950). Cf. note 77 infra.
24 Large damage awards have been rare in Indiana, and as of 1975 no award has ever
exceeded $500,000. The largest single recovery handed down in an Indiana malpractice
suit was $435,000 in 1973. Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Jan. 14, 1975, at 1. How-
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while workmen's compensation laws modify the underlying common law
tort action, and discard negligence,"5 the plaintiff under the Malpractice
Act must prove his case under the common law.
The Malpractice Act, except in the limited instance of a written
contract to cure, requires proof of negligence, as do "no-fault" automo-
bile reparation statutes. 6 While the Act sets an absolute ceiling on
damage awards," "no-fault" statutes preclude suit unless the damages
incurred reach a certain threshold,"8 and sometimes limit pain and suf-
fering awards to a percentage of reasonable medical expenses."' Unlike
the Malpractice Act, "no-fault" laws guarantee that an injured plaintiff
will recover all medical expenses. Although a plaintiff may not sue for
personal injury damages below a threshold figure, under "no-fault" he
must maintain insurance covering his medical expenses as a substitute
for the recovery bf damages, and may then sue for medical expenses
which exceed the required policy limits.3"
It is apparent that the Malpractice Act shares some of the charac-
teristics of "no-fault" statutes and workmen's compensation acts. How-
ever, some features of the Act are unique. This note will consider
whether certain provisions violate rights which ate constitutionally
protected.
DUE PROCESS
The Malpractice Act provides that "the total amount recoverable
for any injury or death of a patient may not exceed five hundred thou-
sand dollars [$500,000]."" Since a plaintiff's common law right to
damages for malpractice is limited only by a requirement that the com-
ever, if Indiana award figures continue their upward trend, the $500,000 ceiling may soon
be met with a constitutional challenge.
25 See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION § 61.00 (1975).
26 Hereinafter references to "malpractice" actions will presume that such actions are
brought under a negligence theory. The Act severely limits contractual malpractice to
written agreements. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-4 (Bums Supp. 1975). See generally Note, Ex-
press Contracts to Cure: The Nature of Contractual Malpractice, 50 IND. L.. 361 (1975).27 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1975).
Some wrongful death statutes also set a ceiling on damages. However, these statutes
were an expansion of rights under the common law; most created a new cause of action.
A damage limit in these statutes is not an abrogation of, but rather a supplement to, the
common law. See, e.g., IND CODE § 34-l-1-2 (Burns 1973).
2 8 Cf. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Kluger v. White, 281
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973); Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972); Manyanares
v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974); Pinnick v. Cleary, 36 Mlass. 1, 271 N.E.2d
592 (1971).
29 See, e.g., Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
38 See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1. 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
31 INn. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1975).
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pensation be reasonable,32 the Malpractice Act abridges the common law
right to reasonable compensation to the extent that such compensation
exceeds $500,000."3 Although the abrogation of common law rights is
generally permissible,34 a statute may not displace common law rights
in violation of state or federal due process standards."
Where workmen's compensation and "no-fault" statutes have been
challenged on due process grounds, the courts have demanded that the
legislation be rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose.3
That much is well settled. However, the courts have sometimes applied
a stricter standard: whether a reasonable substitute has been provided
for the common law rights which have been abridged.37 Only one re-
cent decision 38 has held that a "reasonable substitute" for common law
rights is constitutionally required. However, the "reasonable substitute"
test has so insistently survived in dictum that it may yet prove to have
constitutional vitality.
32 See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Cheek, 152 Ind. 663, 678, 53 N.E. 641, 646 (1899);
Collins v. Clayton & Lambert Mg. Co., 299 F.2d 362, 365 (6th Cir. 1962).
3 31 In finding that an Act of Congress which immunized federal officers from civil dam-
ages for false imprisonment was a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, the Indiana Supreme Court held that:
The right to damages, to be recovered in a civil action, for false imprisonment, is
a chose in action-is property-and passes to one's representatives at death, by
the law of Indiana.
Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370, 373 (1863) (emphasis in original).
" See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) (statute regulating grain warehouses).
See also McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 685, 72 N.E. 854, 859 (1904), in which the
court held that "the grant of legislative power implies a right to change the common law,
particularly with reference to administrative and remedial processes . . . ." Cf. Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923) (concerning a workmen's compensation
statute) in which the Supreme Court stated:
It is settled by the decisions of this Court and by an overwhelming array of state
decisions, that such statutes are not open to constitutional objection because they
abrogate common law defenses or impose liability without fault.
Id. at 422. But cf. The Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Board,
161 Ky. 562, 170 S.W. 1166 (1914) in which the Supreme Court of Kentucky held In-
valid the Kentucky workmen's compensation law because it violated a provision of the
Kentucky constitution denying the legislature the power to limit the amount to be recovered
for personal injury or property damage.
" In Manley v. State, 196 Ind. 529, 149 N.E. 51 (1925) the Indiana Supreme Court
held:
Except as forbidden or controlled by some provision of the state Constitution, or
of the Constitution of the United States or laws and treaties made under it, the
legislature has power to enact statutes which change the rules of the common law,
however ancient.
Id. at 532, 149 N.E. at 52.
36 See text accompanying note 39 infra.
37 See text accompanying note 44 infra.
38 Montgomery v. Daniels, 81 Misc. 2d 373, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1975), rev"d,
No. 359 (Ct. App., N.Y., Nov. 25, 1975), discussed in text accompanying note 48 infra.
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Minimum Rationality Test
The United States Supreme Court has stated that legislation abridg-
ing the common law does not violate the due process clause if the legis-
lation is related to a permissible state objective.39 Under this test, if a
set of facts could exist which would justify the legislative action, these
facts must be presumed to have existed when the statute was enacted."
This standard, which asks merely fori minimal rationality, is designed
to allow the greatest possible discretion to the legislature.'"
The most probable objective of the legislature in enacting the Mal-
practice Act was to prevent the loss of health care manpower which
might be caused by the unavailability and expense of malpractice in-
surance. This is a goal which the legislature unquestionably may pur-
sue through its broad power to protect the public health. 2 The statute
bears at least a rational relation to guaranteeing the availability of mal-
practice insurance coverage, albeit at the expense of the injured patient.
A reduced payout by insurance companies will enable the companies to
make coverage available to a greater number of health care providers,
and at lower rates. Limiting damage awards reduces the actuarial risk
which in turn may lead to lower rates. Of course, the possibility exists,
since insurance company rates are set nationally, that large judgments
elsewhere will keep Indiana insurance premiums high. Under the mini-
mal rationality test, however, the wisdom of the legislature is not open
to question. The Indiana Malpractice Act seems rationally related to
attaining its objective.
Reasonable Substitute Test
Once it has been found that a statute survives the minimal ration-
ality test, that is often the end of the matter."3 However, many courts,
39 Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929).
40 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938). See also Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1876).
11 Cf., e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966); Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
42See Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N.E. 862 (1902); State ex rel. Burroughs v.
Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 50 N.E. 750 (1898); State ex rel. Walker v. Green, 112 Ind. 462,
14 N.E. 352 (1887); Eastman v. State, 109 Ind. 278, 10 N.E. 97 (1886).43 In considering a due process challenge to the Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Indiana Supreme Court did not expressly apply any test. The Court concluded merely
that certain of its provisions under attack were "not unreasonable and ...well within
the legislative power." Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 103, 26 N.E.2d 399,
403 (1940). No reference to a "reasonable substitute" appears in the opinion.
The court in Warren, however, assumed that the workmen's compensation system was
an "elective" provision, which an employee could choose to avoid. Id. at 102-03, 26 N.E.2d
at 402-03. It is unclear whether the court would have applied some variant of the "reason-
able substitute" test bad the act been mandatory.
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faced with due process challenges to workmen's compensation and "no-
fault" automobile liability acts, have considered whether these statutes
have provided a reasonable substitute for the plaintiff's abridged com-
mon law rights. In a leading case, New York Central Railroad v.
White,44 the New York workmen's compensation law was challenged
under the due process clause as an interference with an employee's right
to compensation commensurate with the damage sustained. The Su-
preme Court noted that
... it perhaps may be doubted whether the State could abolish all
rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without
setting up something adequate in their stead. No such question is
here presented, and we intimate no opinion on it. The statute under
consideration sets aside one body of rules only to establish another
system in its place. If the employee is no longer able to recover as
much as before in the case of being injured through the employer's
negligence, he is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of
injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty
and expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of
damages."'
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the New York law was a reason-
able substitute for the rights abridged. This standard demands a quid
pro quo-in exchange for the benefits created by statute the plaintiff
forsakes some benefits which he possessed at common law.
Although the White dictum arose in the context of workmen's
compensation, a system which supercedes the common law action in its
entirety," some courts have sought a "reasonable substitute" in "no-
fault," where the common law action is only partially abridged."7 Re-
cently, in striking down the New York no-fault statute on a number of
The provision of the workmen's compensation act which made it mandatory in the case
of coal mines was analyzed by the United States Supreme Court in Lower Vein Coal Co.
v. Industrial Bd., 255 U.S. 144 (1921), where the Court held that neither the fourteenth
amendment nor §§ 21 or 23 of the Indiana bill of rights (just compensation and equal
privileges) were violated by the act. The Warren court indicated that this was a correct
interpretation of the Indiana constitution. 217 Ind. 93 at 103, 26 N.E.2d at 403. However,
in Lower Vein Coal, the employer, not an employee, had challenged the act. It is unlikely
that the employer would raise, or could raise, an attack on a statute on the theory that no
"reasonable substitute" had been provided for an employee's rights. Indeed, in no case in-
volving workmen's compensation has the Supreme Court of Indiana been called upon to
decide whether the act provides a "reasonable substitute" for a plaintiff's common law rights.
See also note 61 infra.
44 243 U.S. 188 (1916).
45 Id. at 201. The force of this dictum was undermined in Arizona Employers' Lia-
bility Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919), in which the Court held that whether the workmen's
compensation act was a "proper substitute" for common law rights was for the "people"
to determine. The law was not so arbitrary, unreasonable, or unjust as to render it void.
Id. at 427.
46See note 77 infra and text accompanying.
4 See note 78 infra and text accompanying.
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grounds, a trial court cited White for the proposition that "A substitute
for an established body of law which is abolished must be adequate.
48
The court concluded that the statute was not a new system of benefits
but rather a bar to suit in tort with nothing in return for the plaintiff.
Other courts reviewing no-fault laws have found benefits for the
plaintiff.49  In Pinnick v. Cleary,"0 the Massachusetts Supreme Court
upheld that state's no-fault plan as minimally rational, and then deter-
mined that the statute provided "an adequate and reasonable substitute
for pre-existing rights."5 However, the court intimated "no opinion
as to whether, and if so in what circumstances, the application of this
test is constitutionally required."5 2 In finding a "reasonable substitute"
under the no-fault law, the court stressed the benefits the plaintiff re-
ceived in return for his partial loss of recovery. Several courts have
noted that under no-fault systems the plaintiff receives a guarantee of
some amount of recovery for his losses, as well as a more prompt and
less costly procedure for obtaining that recovery. 3
However, under the Malpractice Act, a patient's recovery is not
guaranteed as it is under "no-fault" and workmen's compensation laws.
The patient must still prove causation and negligence in court, and he
is still subject to the traditional defenses of contributory negligence5 "
and assumption of risk."5 Nor is the patient assured a prompt recovery;
his claim faces the time-consuming additional hurdle posed by the Medi-
4 8 Montgomery v. Daniels, 81 Misc. 2d 373, -, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
The trial court's decision in this case was reversed on direct appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals. Montgomery v. Daniels, No. 359 (Ct. App., N.Y., Nov. 25, 1975). In
speaking of the "reasonable substitute" test, the court held that, since the "no-fault" law
was a reasonable substitute, there was no need to reach the constitutional question framed
by plaintiff. In passing, however, the court doubted the vitality of the test itself, which it
believed had been undermined by subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
49 See, e.g., Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Manzanares v.
Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).
50360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
51 Id. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 602.
52 Id. at - 271 N.E.2d at 605 n.16.
"' See, e.g., Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1974); Manzanares v.
Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 599, 522 P.2d 1291, 1301 (1974); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, -,
271, N.E.2d 592, 605-07 (1971); Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 212, 304 A.2d 881,
886 (1973).
5 4 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection. W. PossaR, HANDaoOK or THE LAW or ToRTS 416
(4th ed. 1971).
-"A plaintiff who has assumed the risk has, in advance
given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him,
and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the de-
fendant is to do or leave undone.
Id. at 440.
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cal Review Panel.56 While the availability of the panel's findings as evi-
dence in a subsequent trial might eliminate the need for extensive expert
testimony, it is more likely that the party opposing the panel's findings
will feel a need to present additional experts to blunt the impact of the
panel's report, resulting in delays and increased cost of a suit. Like-
wise, the Medical Review Panel procedures and the need for a court
certification of awards from the patients' compensation fund ' seem
likely to increase the potential cost of a suit. Compared to the no-fault
laws and workmen's compensation, then, the plaintiff under the Mal-
practice Act gains relatively little.
On the other hand, some plaintiffs under the Act will be deprived
of a great deal. Under no-fault, the "threshold" limitations on suit deny
recovery only for injury which is minor. The Malpractice Act, how-
ever, denies recovery at the opposite end of the spectrum. The $500,000
damage limitation 8 will operate to deny compensation only in those
cases where the injury reaches the most catastrophic proportions-where
the damages exceed $500,000. Thus the individual most severely in-
jured will lose the most under the Malpractice Act.
One plausible benefit created for a plaintiff by the Malpractice Act
is the assurance of an expert witness' testimony on his behalf, should the
Medical Review Panel find in his favor. Any member of the Panel is
required to appear and testify in a trial if called by one of the parties."'
Although the plaintiff must, as before, bear the cost of the witness' ap-
pearance, he is at least guaranteed a physician's testimony.
. One might also contend that, under the Malpractice Act, patient-
plaintiffs receive a benefit in that medical care will be more readily
available. The limitation on damage awards could increase the avail-
ability of malpractice insurance, thereby eliminating a factor in the re-
duction of medical manpower. Similarly, it might be argued that the
patient-plaintiff receives a benefit in terms of lower personal medical
costs, since lower awards will induce lower insurance premiums to phy-
sicians, the savings on which would be passed along to the plaintiff in
the form of lower medical fees. But these benefits inure to all members
of society, not merely to malpractice victims, while it is only malpractice
victims who are forced to bear the costs incident to the benefits.
66 See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9--1 to -10 (Burns Supp. 1975).
67 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-4-3 (Burns Supp. 1975).
58 Issn. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1975).
5" IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-9 (Burns Supp. 1975).
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Summary
The Malpractice Act is at least rationally related to the important
legislative goal of ensuring medical care to the people of Indiana. There-
fore, under the standard generally applied, the Act's limitation on dam-
ages does not violate due process.6 Some courts have inquired further
whether a statute abridging the common law has supplied a "reasonable
substitute" for the rights abridged. Under the criteria developed in
these decisions, the Malpractice Act fails to provide such a substitute.
However, it is unclear whether the reasonable substitute test, which has
persisted in dictum, is constitutionally required. Thus it remains to be
seen whether the courts would invalidate a law because it fails to pro-
vide a reasonable substitute for abridged common law rights.6 '
6 0 The statute of limitations may also come under attack on constitutional grounds.
The Act provides that no malpractice action may be brought unless filed within two years
from the date of the act complained of, and this section is made applicable to all persons
regardless of minority or other legal disability. An exception is made for a victim under
the age of six, who may bring suit anytime prior to his eighth birthday. IND. CoDe § 16-
9.5-3-1 (Burns Supp. 1975). This section of the Act was apparently intended to overcome
the decision of the Indiana Supreme Court in Chaffin v. Nicosia, - Ind. -, 310
N.E.2d 867 (1974).
In Chaffin, a malpractice action alleging negligent injury at birth was filed one day
before the plaintiff's twenty-third birthday, in reliance upon the Indiana legal disability
statute, I=o. CoDE § 34-1-2-5 (Burns 1973), which permits a minor claimant to bring suit
any time within two years after reaching majority. The defendant contended that the
action was barred by the broad language of the two-year statute for medical malpractice,
IND, CODE § 34-4-19-1 (Burns 1973), which was said to implicitly repeal the legal dis-
ability statute in malpractice cases.
The supreme court construed the legal disability statute as applying in malpractice,
and allowed the plaintiff to proceed. The malpractice statute, said the court, "must not
be allowed to produce an absurd result, which the legislature, as a reasonably minded
body, could not have possibly intended ... ." - Ind. at -, 310 N.E.2d at 870. The
court noted that to read the malpractice statute
as a legislative bar on all malpractice actions under all circumstances unless com-
menced within two years from the act complained of (discoverable or otherwise)
would raise substantial questions under the Article 1, § 12 guarantee of open courts
and redress for injury to everyman, not to mention the offense to lay concepts
of justice.
Id.
This strong language indicates that the Malpractice Act's statute of limitations may
face a constitutional attack to the extent that it may work an inequity. The statute, like
its predecessor, is absolute on its face in the sense that no "discoverability" exception is
provided. However, the courts have sometimes construed the statute to relieve its harsh-
ness. See Note, Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations, 32 IND. L.J. 528 (1957). To
the extent that the statute as amended cannot be similarly glossed, Chaffin indicates that
in the case of a minor at least, substantial questions will be raised under the Indiana
constitution.
61 This may turn on little more than the vitality of substantive due process in Indiana.
Indiana cases indicate that there are substantive rights which are protected by article 1,
§ 12 of the Indiana constitution. In Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10 N.E.2d 619
(1937), the supreme court held that abolition of the civil action for alienation of affec-
tion was not a violation of the state constitution. The court's premise was that liability for
alienation is incident to the marital relation, which is wholly under legislative control. The
right to one's wife's affections was accordingly not "property" within the meaning of the
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RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The section of the Malpractice Act providing that a judge will de-
termine the damages to be awarded from the patients' compensation
fund62 may constitute a violation of both the state" and federal" guar-
antees of trial by jury.65 Although the seventh amendment to the United
States Constitution does not guarantee jury trial in civil actions in the
state courts,66 it will control malpractice litigation in the federal courts. 7
constitution. One writer, however, views this case as meaning that it is within the police
power to control marriage, despite an infringement on a property right. Twomley, The
Indiana Bill o1 Rights, 20 IND. L.J. 211, 232 (1945). More broadly, the author views the
fact that the court has not held that the article 1, § 12 guarantee is merely procedural as a
strong indication that the section assures certain substantive rights. Id. at 231-32.
Until fairly recently, the Indiana courts upheld a doctrine of "natural rights" emanating
from article 1, § 1 of the state constitution. See Dept. of Financial Inst. v. General Finance
Corp., 227 Ind. 373, 86 N.E.2d 444 (1949); Paulsen, "Natural Rights"-A Constitutional
Doctrine in Indiana, 25 IND. L.J. 123 (1950); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due
Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950). Whether this constitutional provision
maintains vitality is open to doubt. The last time the Indiana Supreme Court used article
1, § 1 to declare a government policy unconstitutional was 1956. Dept. of Ins. v. Motor
Ins. Corp., 236 Ind. 1, 138 N.E.2d 157 (1956).
62 IND. CoDa § 16-9.5-4-3 (Burns Supp. 1975).
63 IND. CoNsT. art. 1, § 20. "In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate."
64 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII provides:
Trial by jury in civil cases.-In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.6sThe discussion of the jury trial implications of the Malpractice Act in this section
does not touch upon those provisions of the Act which limit the total damages recoverable
for injury. See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1975).
Damage limitations and damage thresholds have been challenged as a violation of the
right to jury trial in some actions. See text accompanying note 79 infra. Such a challenge,
however, does not seem to be firmly grounded. A jury trial issue is properly presented
where there are triable issues of fact and these issues are submitted to a trier of fact other
than the jury, or are re-examined inconsistently with the common law. Where some ele-
ment of damages, or some amount of damages above or below a certain figure may not be
recovered as a matter of legislative enactment, no triable issue of fact exists as to those
damages. Accordingly, no question of the right to jury trial is raised. A challenge to the
constitutionality of a damage limitation more properly raises questions of due process, see
text accompanying note 31 supra, or of equal protection, see text accompanying note 106
infra. See Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974), and text accompanying
note 81 infra.
66 See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294
(1877); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
532 (1874).67 The seventh amendment will apply directly when a malpractice action under Indiana
law is filed in federal district court under diversity jurisdiction.
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), the defen-
dant in an action for personal injuries contended that plaintiff was his employee under the
state workmen's compensation act, which limited his recovery to the terms of that act.
The Supreme Court held that, regardless of the contrary state practice, the question whether
the plaintiff was a statutory employee was a question for the jury. State law could not
alter the "essential character or function of a federal court." Id. at 539. Simler v. Conner,
372 U.S. 221 (1963), firmly established that, state practice to the contrary notwithstanding,
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The Act requires that pursuant to a judgment or settlement, a claim
against the patients' compensation fund be filed with the court in which
the action is pending, or, if none is pending, with the circuit or superior
court of Marion County.68 The court in which the petition is filed may
then hear evidence on what damages, if any, should be awarded from
the fund, and the "court shall determine the amount for which the fund
is liable."6" The use of the term "court" in this context is apparently
intended to lodge in the presiding judge the power to set awards from
the fund.7"
The extent of the judge's powers under this section is not clearly
defined. The provision could be interpreted to give the judge no more
than his usual power to evaluate the reasonableness of the jury award."
Yet this would render the provision superfluous, especially where a
the seventh amendment mandates a trial by jury of the legal issues in a diversity case.
The seventh amendment has been construed to mean that the right to jury trial, as
found in the English courts in 1791, the date of the amendment's adoption, must be pre-
served in federal court. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Scott,
Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Practice, 31 HAv. L. Rlv. 669 (1918); Wolfram,
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MNrN. L. Rxv. 639, 640-42
(1973). Although it has been suggested that this "static" approach to the right is not man-
dated by the seventh amendment, and perhaps should be discarded, the matter is well settled
in the Supreme Court. See Wolfram, supra, at 747.
In the federal courts a malpractice action would almost certainly be one "at law" for
jury trial purposes. In Ransom v. Staso Milling Co., 2 F.R.D. 128 (D. Vt. 1941), Judge
Leamy stated that
where the gist of the action is for money damages, which at common law would
fall within a well recognized form of action, such as an action of tort for damage
to property, or person, the case is for the jury if demand for jury is made.
Id. at 131. In United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 555 (1951), the Supreme
Court indicated that the seventh amendment "preserves to private individuals the right to
trial by jury on [tort claims against private parties] in a federal court." It remains to
be seen, however, whether the federal right to jury trial includes the right to have damages
assessed by the jury. See generally note 86 infra & text accompanying.
One commentator has pointed out that the information available on jury trial at
common law is far from complete. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 80 HAnv. L. REv. 289, 290 (1966). However, constitutional doubts attend remittitur
in the federal courts, despite the fact that the plaintiff may refuse, and elect a new trial
on damages. See 6A J.W. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACcE ff 59.05[3] (1959). The Indi-
ana Act's procedure-insofar as it gives the judge discretion to recompute the amount of
recovery from the patients' compensation fund-cannot fail to raise doubts at least as
serious as those raised by remittitur.68 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-4-3(1) (Burns Supp. 1975).
6 9 IND. CoDE § 16-9.5-4-3(5) (Burns Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
70 The Act specifies that any legal term or term of art, otherwise undefined in the Act,
should have "such meaning as is consistent with the common law." IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-3
(Burns Supp. 1975). The term "court" has sometimes been interpreted to include both
judge and jury. However, it has also been considered synonymous with "judge" when used
in a statute. BrAcE's LAw DIcrIoNAR 425 (4th ed. 1968). Although the term "court" is
therefore somewhat ambiguous in itself, interpreting it to mean "the judge" seems most
logical under the Act See text accompanying note 72 infra.
71 Cf., e.g,, C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOO or T=a LAW or DArcACES §§ 18, 19 (1935).
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judgment has already been obtained in a prior action. Moreover, a
judge who merely examines the reasonableness of a jury verdict ordi-
narily is not empowered to hear additional evidence, as provided by the
Act. 2 The statute most likely intends that the judge recompute the
damages, thereby effectively depriving the jury of the power to award
damages. This may constitute a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional
right to jury trial, if it can first be established that a claim against the
fund gives rise to a right to jury trial under the Indiana constitution. 3
72 See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-4-3(5) (Burns Supp. 1975).
71 The textual discussion assumes that there is a constitutional right to jury trial en-
forceable against the patients' compensation fund. This assumption, however, cannot easily
be verified.
The Indiana courts may adopt the position that since the fund did not exist before
1852, the time of the adoption of the state constitution, there is no constitutional right to
jury trial enforceable against the fund. Cf. Millers Nat. Ins. Co. v. American State Bank,
206 Ind. 511, 190 N.E. 433 (1934); Crown Point v. Newcomer, 204 Ind. 589, 185 N.E. 440
(1933); Allen v. Anderson, 57 Ind. 388 (1877), which set out the test for constitutionally
mandated jury trial. If a claim against the fund is a "special statutory" proceeding, no
constitutional right to jury trial attaches. See Indianapolis v. Schmid, 251 Ind. 147, 240
N.E.2d 66 (1968). However, this line of analysis may be undermined by the Deckard case,
discussed at length below.
Another approach would be to ask whether the action is analogous to a suit which at
common law would have been triable to a jury. The broad and difficult consideration here
may be whether a claim against the patients' compensation fund is a claim against the
state. If the claim is against the state, an argument that there is a right to jury trial is
considerably weakened. Generally, suits against the state were unheard of prior to the
adoption of the Indiana constitution in 1852. Contract damage claims against the state
were first statutorily authorized in 1889 by what is now IND. CODE § 34-4-16-1 (Burns
1973). Therefore, the right to jury trial against the state might not be constitutionally
mandated. On the other hand, if the patients' compensation fund were regarded as the
functional equivalent of a private insurer, it is likely that a judgment against the insured
in a jury trial would be conclusive against the fund, which would not be entitled to a re-
determination of damages if that would impinge upon the jury's province. See generally
20 J.A. APPLEmAN, INsURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 11521 (1962).
It is not entirely clear whether a claim against the patients' compensation fund is a
claim against the state. An analogy might be drawn to state workmen's compensation
funds, which have been described as trust funds for the benefit of the employees. See 7A
J.A. APPLEmAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4592 (1962). Some courts have held that
such funds are not private corporations. See, e.g., Yedor v. Ocean Acc. & Guarantee Corp.,
85 Cal. App. 2d 698, 194 P.2d 95 (1948) (for venue purposes); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n
v. Russell, 127 Tex. 230, 91 S.W.2d 317 (1936). They have been described by other courts
as agents of the state. See, e.g., Gilmore v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 23 Cal. App. 2d
325, 73 P.2d 640 (1937); State Ins. Fund v. Boyland, 125 N.Y.S.2d 169, 282 App. Div.
516 (1953), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 1009, 133 N.E.2d 457 (1956); Monroe Logging Co. v. Dep't of
Labor and Indus., 21 Wash. 2d 800, 153 P.2d 511 (1944); State ex rel. Christensen v. Nugget
Coal Co., 60 Wyo. 51, 144 P.2d 944 (1944). However, some courts, faced with suits against
workmen's compensation funds, have held that these are not suits against the state for
purposes of sovereign immunity. Burum v. State Compensation Ins. Fund., 30 Cal. 2d 575,
184 P.2d 505 (1947); State v. Padgett, 54 N.D. 211, 209 N.W. 388 (1926). Workmen's
compensation funds have also been described as "special" as opposed to "public" funds.
See, e.g., Senske v. Fairmont & Waseca Canning Co., 232 Minn. 350, 45 N.W.2d 640 (1951);
State ex rel. Stearns v. Olson, 43 N.D. 619, 175 N.W. 714 (1919). Although the patients'
compensation fund resembles a workmen's compensation fund in many respects, mere anal-
ogy cannot resolve the question of whether a claim against the fund is a claim against
the state.
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Workmen's compensation and "no-fault" automobile statutes have
often been challenged as denying the right to jury trial. The courts have
generally sustained such statutes against constitutional attack, articulat-
ing two grounds for decision. First, it has been held that if a statute
abolishes the original cause of action, there is nothing to be tried to a
Doctrines developed in the area of sovereign immunity also yield uncertainty. As e-
gards municipal corporations, the "proprietary-governmental" distinction was once a major
test to determine which state activities would be subject to tort liability. See, e.g., Fuller &
Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARv. L. REv. 437 (1941). Governmental
immunity was said to be "an attribute of governmental functions exercised solely for the
public at large and not for the private benefit of the municipality," with the corollary that
when monetary returns are an important factor in the establishment of a function,
the governmental unit is liable as a proprietor, because it acts for its own benefit
and not for the public at large. Some courts justify the exception partly on the
ground that there should be liability for torts committed during the exercise of
activities formerly performed by private persons or corporations, but the historical
facts are that most of the functions now regarded as governmental began as pri-
vate enterprises.
Id. at 442. It has often been suggested that the most legitimate policy underlying govern-
mental immunity is the need to prevent a depletion of the treasury which would impair gov-
ernmental functions. See, e.g., Note, The Tort Liability of the State of Indiana Perkins v.
State, 46 IND. L.J. 544, 549-50 (1971). In the case of the patients' compensation fund,
which is maintained separately from the general fund of the state, see IND. CoE § 16-9.5-
4-1(a) (Burns Supp. 1975), this policy concern seems irrelevant. In any event, sovereign
immunity from tort liability was grounded in policies very different from those underlying-
the patients' compensation fund.
In summary, it is not possible to state with assurance whether a claim against the
patients' compensation fund is a claim against the state of Indiana for purposes of the
right to jury trial. One Indiana case, however, indicates broadly that in an action for
damages for personal injury there may be a constitutional right to jury trial enforceable
even against historically immune governmental entities. In City of Terre Haute v. Deckard,
243 Ind. 289, 183 N.E.2d 815 (1962), the plaintiff brought an action for damages caused
when a city police car struck plaintiff's car from behind. Trial was to a jury, which
awarded damages to plaintiff. Several weeks later, defendant moved for remittitur. The-
court rejected defendant's argument.
First, without alluding to the immunity of the city, judge Landis noted that Art. 1,
§ 20 of the Indiana constitution provides that the right of jury trial, in "all civil cases,"
must remain inviolate. The court held that the suit against the city "was an action in tort
for damages and was, therefore, a civil cause in which the parties were entitled to a trial
by jury." Id. at 293, 83 N.E.2d at 817. The court later reaffirmed its conclusion that
plaintiff's right to jury trial was based, not in statute, but upon the state constitution. Id.
at 296, 183 N.E.2d at 818.
The Deckard case arose under the Law of March 6, 1945, ch. 197 § 1 [1945] (repealed
1974), which imposed limited liability for damages caused by the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle by a member of either a city police or fire department. This statute was
first enacted in 1945. Although the cause of action therefore arose under a statute enacted
long after the adoption of the Indiana constitution, the supreme court found a constitu-
tional right to jury trial.
Deckard may indicate that the Indiana Supreme Court accepts the view of the federal
courts with regard to actions created by statute-that if common law rights and remedies
analogous to the statutory action were tried to a jury, jury trial is preserved by the fed.
eral constitution. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty Co., 416 U.S. 363 (1974). If this is
so, an action to recover damages from the patients' compensation fund may be a "civil
action" within the meaning of article 1, § 20 of the Indiana constitution. At the very least,
Deckard casts considerable doubt upon an argument that a suit against the state, since it
was not a recognized common law action, carries no constitutional right to a jury deter-
mination of triable issues.
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jury, and therefore the right is not violated. Second, it has been said
that the assessment of damages is not a fundamental element of the right
to jury trial."
The Abolished Cause of Action
It is well settled that the legislature may alter the common law by
adding or removing causes of action." Once the legislature has abol-
ished a cause of action to which jury trial was incident, nothing re-
mains for a jury to try. Legislation of this sort does not abolish the
right to jury trial, merely the cause of action which gave rise to it.76
In the case of workmen's compensation, the cause of action has
clearly been abolished. The entire right to remedial relief is newly
created, and the determination of injury and compensation is lodged
with an arbitration panel."
"No-fault" statutes, on the other hand, do not entirely abolish the
cause of action. Below the damage threshold, there is no cause of ac-
tion-plaintiff must look to his own insurance coverage. The cause of
74 In State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 210, 117 P. 1101, 1119 (1911), the court also ap-
plied the "reasonably just substitute" test to the state workmen's compensation law and
in doing so concluded that the statute was valid even though it abrogated the right to jury
trial. The court concluded that certainty of recovery was a reasonable substitute for plain-
tiff's right to jury assessment of damages. The application of the reasonable substitute test,
which is a due process test, in this context seems more confusing than helpful, however.
75 See note 34 supra & text accompanying.
76 See, e.g., Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 235 (1916); Lasky v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 196 So. 2d 9, 22 (Fla. 1974); Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217
Ind. 93, 102, 26 N.E.2d 399, 403 (1940); Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 210, 304
A.2d 881, 885 (1973). See also Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971), in
which the Massachusetts Supreme Court, without discussion, held that the state's no-fault
statute did not violate the right to jury trial.
7 7 The Indiana Supreme Court has taken the view that workmen's compensation is
the creation of a new system, attendant upon the employer-employee contractual relation.
This new remedy displaces any rights held under the common law, and no jury trial issue
remains. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 102 N.E.2d 399 (1940).
One noted commentator on the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act has described
its novel provisions in this way:
[Ms experience in the administration of Workmen's Compensation matters length-
ens, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the theory of compensation exists
entirely apart from tort or from contract. As long as liability can be imposed
upon an innocent employer without negligence on his part, and with negligence,
or assumption of risk, or the act of a fellow-servant being disregarded completely
on the employee's side, there is little resemblance to anything heretofore known
in tort law. The contract theory is scarcely more plausible. . . .Thus it would
seem that the theory of Workmen's Compensation rests entirely upon the status,
or the relationship which a workman bears to the work he is doing.
B.Y. SMALL, WORKMEN_'S COMPENSATION LAW OF INDIANA § 1.1 (1950).
It has also been said that "compensation laws constitute a statutory departure from,
or as commonly stated are in derogation of the common law, they are not supplemental,
cumulative, amendatory or declaratory of the common law, but wholly substitutional of it."
1 W.I. SCHNEIDER, SCHNEIDER'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6 (1941). See also Federal
Cement & Tile Co. v. Pruitt, 128 Ind. 126, 146 N.E.2d 557 (1957).
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action survives once a certain threshold of damages is reached, how-
ever, and plaintiff's right to jury trial is preserved."8 Jury trial chal-
lenges have been made to the damage threshold in "no-fault" nonethe-
less. Although one court has viewed the threshold as an abrogation of
the right to jury trial,79 most courts have concluded that the threshold
operates only to remove the cause of action, leaving nothing to be tried
by a jury.8" The Kansas Supreme Court took this view in Manzanares
v. Bell,8 in which the court turned aside a challenge to the state "no-
fault" law. The court indicated that the jury trial attack on the threshold
was misplaced. The attack on the threshold was more properly based
on the due process clause, as a challenge to the entire "no-fault" system. 3
The Malpractice Act, on the other hand, in no sense abolishes the
cause of action for malpractice. Liability is still based in the common
law actions of contract or tort. 4 Although an absolute ceiling is placed
on damages," liability and recovery up to that limit are triable issues.
Since these issues remain, it cannot be said that nothing remains that
might be tried by the jury.
The Assessment of Damages as an Element of Jury Trial
Statutes challenged as abridging the common law right to a jury
assessment of damages have sometimes been defended on the ground
that the assessment of damages is not fundamental to the right of jury
trial. In Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines,86 the court considered a challenge
to the Warsaw Convention's ceiling on damages for injuries sustained
in international airline flight. The court reasoned that
[a]t common law the assessment of damages in a default, in tort and
in contract, was not considered a function of the jury and stood upon
a different footing from the trial of issues of fact. The measuring of
78 Cf. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360
Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1974).
7 9 Montgomery v. Daniels, 81 Misc. 2d 373, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1975), rezwd,
No. 359 (Ct. App., N.Y., Nov. 25, 1975).
8
o See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
81 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).
82 Id. at 616, 522 P.2d at 1312.
8 3 Id.
8 4 Cf. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1(h) (Burns Supp. 1975):
"Malpractice" means any tort or breach of contract based on health care or
professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health
care provider, to a patient.8 5 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1975).
86152 F. Supp. 486, 488-89 (D.N.J. 1957).
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damages by a jury, therefore, would seem to be a matter of practice
rather than of right.1
7
Similarly, in a decision regarding a "no-fault" statute, a member of
the Illinois Supreme Court thought that, since at common law an assess-
ment of damages was usually performed by a sheriff upon a writ of
inquiry of damages or, in its discretion, by the court itself,88 jury assess-
ment of damages was a matter of practice and not of right.
In federal court the seventh amendment right to jury trial reflects
the right as it existed at common law in 1791."' Similarly, state con-
stitutional guarantees of jury trial have been interpreted in light of the
common law at the time of the adoption of each state constitution."
The scope of the modern right to jury trial is to a large extent, there-
fore, molded by the history of the English common law.
Clearly, the jury has always been limited in awarding damages.
By the early fourteen hundreds, judges began modifying the jury award
where it was entirely unreasonable.91 This procedure was later aban-
doned in favor of the practice of granting a new trial.9 2 The charge
or instruction on the damage issue was a feature of jury trial from
the first. 93
87 Id. at 488.
The jury trial challenge in Pierre seems to have been entirely misplaced. An absolute
limit on recovery is more in the nature of a partial abolition of the cause of action than
an abridgment of jury trial. See generally note 65 supra.
88 O'Brien v. Brown, 403 Ill. 183, 193, 85 N.E.2d 685, 691 (1949). See also Povlich v.
Glodich, 311 Ill. 149, 142 N.E. 467 (1924). But see BLAcK's LAW DIcriONARY 1786 (4th
ed. 1968), which defines a writ of inquiry as "[a] writ which issues after the plaintiff in
an action has obtained a judgment by default ... " See also McGowin v. Dickson, 182
Ala. 161, 62 So. 685 (1913); Lennon v. Rawitzer, 57 Conn. 583, 19 A. 334 (1889).
89 See, e.g., Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1934); Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934); Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
Ironically, England no longer uses jury trial for civil cases except in slander, libel, and
a few other instances. See Defense Research Institute, The Civil Jury System (monograph)
(1974), quoting address by Chief Justice Burger, testimonial dinner for Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court Chief Justice Bell, Nov. 14, 1970.
90 See, e.g., People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 287, 231 P.2d 832, 835
(1951); Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 508-09, 283 N.E.2d 474, 490 (1972) (dissenting
opinion). In Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940), the
Indiana Supreme Court held that:
Actions for injuries to the person caused by the negligence of another were known
under the common law of England, and triable by a jury. It follows, therefore,
that the right to a jury trial in common law actions for injuries to the person
due to negligence is fully protected by Article 1 § 20 of our Constitution.
Id. at 102, 26 N.E.2d at 403. See also Dean v. State Board of Medical Registration &
Examination, 233 Ind. 32, 116 N.E.2d 503 (1954), which construes article 1, § 20 of the Indi-
ana constitution to guarantee jury trial in those actions which were triable by a jury prior
to June 18, 1852, the date on which the constitution took effect.
91 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF TBE LAw OF DAmrES 26 (1935).92 Id.
93 Id. at 24-28.
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It is also true, as the Pierre' case indicates, that in a default action
at common law, damages could be assessed either by a judge or by the
jury."' The Pierre case, however, overlooks the exceptional nature of
the default action at common law in drawing a conclusion that damages
are not essential to the right of jury trial."6 The weight of authority
indicates that, default actions to one side, the assessment of damages is
fundamental.9 Although subject to limitations by the judge, the jury
has assessed damages since the creation of the damage remedy."8 For
instance, in 1763 the Court of Common Pleas refused to grant a new
trial for excessive damages in a personal injury case,9 noting that
the court ought never to grant a new trial in an action founded upon
a personal tort, unless the damages are such as do at the first blush
appear to be quite outrageous. Because the damages, which do entirely
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, must in every
such action be ideal and speculative, and the jury are the persons
in whom the power of ascertaining damages in all cases is by the
constitution vested.100
The Indiana Supreme Court, in an action for personal injury damages,
has stated that a "determination of the extent of the injury complained
of, and the proper compensation therefor, were peculiarly within the
province and power of the trial jury . . . ." This implies that jury
94 Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
95
ee Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 244, 248, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792 (1764);
Bruce v. Rawlins, 3 Wils. K.B. 61, 62, 95 Eng. Rep. 934 (1770); 5 J.W. MooRE, MooRE's
FEDERAL PRAcT cE 1 38.1931 (2d ed. 1975).96 Indeed, the federal court practice of denying the right to jury trial in a default action
is regarded as exceptional. Cf. 5 J.W. MooRE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcricE f1 38.19[3] (2d
ed. 1975).9 7 See, e.g., McClean, Juries and the Assessment of Damages, 4 SOL. Q. 1, 2 (1965):
The first limitations of any sort [upon English jury trial of damages] were
contained in the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854; before then, there was no
alternative to jury trial. In that Act, trial by judge alone was provided for ac-
count, and could be used in other cases if all the parties consented. But there was
nothing in the nature of a direction that it should be used.
While a new trial would generally be granted in the case of excessive damages at
common law, see W. FoRsYTH, HISTORYt oF TRIAm BY Ju-z 156-58 (1875), there was a
limit to this. "Juries may baffle the court by persisting in the same opinion, and in such
cases it has been the practice for the latter ultimately to give way." Id. at 158.
See also cases collected in note 101 infra.
98 C. McCoRmurcx, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAmAGEs 24 (1935).
9 9 Beardmore v. Lord Halifax, Common Pleas (1763), quoted in J.H. BEALE, A Cor-
.EcMzoN oF CASES ON THE MEAsuRE OF DAMAGES 7 (2d ed. 1909).
11* Id. at 7. See also Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (1677),
quoted in J.H. BEAi, A COLLECrOiN OF CASES ON Ts MEAsuE Or DAMAGES 2 (3d ed.
1928).
101 Cleveland, Cin., Chi., & St. L.R.R. v. Hadley, 170 Ind. 204, 216, 82 N.E. 1025,
1030 (1907). In City of Terre Haute v. Deckard, 243 Ind. 289, 183 N.E.2d 815 (1962),
the Indiana Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly rejected evidence offered
by defendant in mitigation of plaintiff's damages, where the evidence was first offered
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assessment of damages was one of those common law rights which did
survive intact the passage of the Indiana constitution.
Moreover, it is well settled that the right to a jury trial extends to
issues of "fact."' 2 The Malpractice Act leaves the liability issue to the
jury, but the award of damages beyond $100,000 is ultimately left to
the judge. 0 3 It has been held that "[c]ompensatory damage tradition-
ally is an issue of fact . . , 104 In a medical malpractice action the
extent of a plaintiff's injuries is often a matter of dispute. It therefore
appears that, insofar as the Act transfers from the jury to the judge
the power over damages, the right to jury trial may be violated. '
weeks after jury trial had ended. Since this personal injury action was a "civil action"
within the jury trial provision, the court held that:
Any effort to raise this defense long after the trial of the case was improper
and invaded appellee's right to have this issue of his case submitted to the jury,
contrary to Art. 1, § 20 .. . of the Indiana Constitution.
Id. at 296, 183 N.E.2d at 818. This buttresses a conclusion that in Indiana the determina-
tion of damages, at least for personal injury, is an element of the right to jury trial. See
also Lombard v. Cory, 95 Idaho 868, 522 P.2d 581 (1974); Osterfoss v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
- Iowa - , 215 N.W.2d 233 (1974); Isaacson v. Russon College, - Me. - , 332
A.2d 757 (1975); Cicale v. Becker, 42 App. Div. 2d 663, 345 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1973); Raisovich
v. Giddings, 214 Va. 485, 201 S.E.2d 606 (1974); Vaughan v. Magee, 218 F. 630, 631 (3d
Cir. 1914).
102 See, e.g., Shearer v. Porter, 155 F.2d 77, 81 (8th Cir. 1946); Pierre v. Eastern Air
Lines, 152 F. Supp. 486, 488 (D.N.J. 1957); Novak v. Chicago & Calumet Dist. Transit
Co., 235 Ind. 489, 135 N.E.2d 1 (1956).
"'See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-4-3(5) (Burns Supp. 1975).
104 Shearer v. Porter, 155 F.2d 77, 81 (8th Cir. 1946) (damage for violation of Office
of Price Administration regulation). See also Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock Co., 36 Cal.
2d 812, 228 P.2d 557 (1951); Croco v. Oregon Short-Line R.R., 18 Utah 311, 54 P.
985 (1898); Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and tIe Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Omo
ST. L.J. 158, 161 (1958); C. McComcx, HANDaooK oF TH LAW or DAMAGES 24 (1935).
10 5 See, however, note 73 supra & text accompanying.
Another consideration, not constitutional in origin but closely related to the question
of the role of the jury under the Act, is the validity of the "Medical Review Panel" pro-
cedure. The Act provides that no action against any health care provider may be com-
menced before the complaint has been presented to a medical review panel and an opinion
rendered by the panel. See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-1 to -10 (Burns Supp. 1975). The opinion
rendered may be introduced into evidence at any subsequent trial, and at first blush would
seem to violate the traditional rule of evidence which forbids expert witnesses from stating
their conclusions on the "ultimate facts in issue" in the case. Ultimate facts have variously
been defined as "facts upon which the plaintiff's right of recovery or the defendant's right
to defeat a recovery necessarily depends." Gerue v. Industrial Comm'n, 205 Wis. 68, 70,
236 N.W. 528, 529 (1931). They are alternatively defined as those facts which are funda-
mental and usually determinative of an entire case. Maeder Steel Prod. Co. v. Zanello,
109 Ore. 562, 220 P. 155 (1923). A substantial number of courts heretofore have forbidden
witnesses to give their opinions upon the ultimate facts in issue. C. McCoRiicK, HAND-
noox or THE LAW or EVIDENCE 27 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). Upon closer analysis, however,
it appears that there is little problem with the use of the panel's opinion.
Statements of opinion upon ultimate issues are sometimes said to "usurp the function"
or "invade the province" of the jury. These expressions do not mean a literal abrogation
of a constitutionally guaranteed jury function, but merely suggest the danger that the jury
might forego independent analysis of the facts and substitute instead the opinion of the
[Vol. 51:143
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EQUAL PROTECTION
The Malpractice Act creates two classifications which may violate
the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, as well as the special
privileges clause of the Indiana constitution. First, the provisions of
the Malpractice Act apply to victims of malpractice but not to victims
of other torts. This classification may be too narrow. Second, the
damage ceiling of the Malpractice Act limits recovery by malpractice
victims who have suffered extensive physical disability as well as by
victims who have extensive pain and suffering damages. This classifica-
tion may be overbroad.
Whether these classifications deny equal protection may depend
upon the degree of judicial scrutiny applied to the Malpractice Act.
If a fundamental right were infringed, the statute would be subject to
strict scrutiny to determine whether it was necessary to a compelling
expert. C. McCoP ncK, HANDBOOK oP THE LAW op EvDENCE 27 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
The Act expressly prohibits any replacement of the jury's deliberations by those of the
panel. The panel's opinion "shall be admissible as evidence in any action subsequently
brought by the claimant in a court of law, but such expert opinion shall not be conclu-
sive ... 2 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-9 (Burns Supp. 1975).
The panel's opinion comes very close to being an impermissible expression of general
belief as to how the case should be decided. It parallels the heretofore forbidden opinion
on ultimate facts. However, this traditional ban is being relaxed in many jurisdictions.
McCoRimICK, supra, at 27. The rationale for allowing an expert's opinion on ultimate issues
lies in the expert's ability to contribute inferences which the jury would not be able to
draw. The complex analysis of medical evidence would seem to be one such area.
Ordinarily the factual basis for the expert's opinion must be clearly expressed. McCoR-
MICx, supra, at 31. For this reason, and for the reason that in evidentiary matters the
more concrete description is preferred to the more abstract one, id. at 23, it is suggested
that the written opinion of the panel include a concise statement of the basis for the conclu-
sion reached. Such a statement is not expressly required by the statute. Nor would it be
essential to a clear understanding of the panel's conclusions, since the panel members are
accessible to parties for presentation in a trial. See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-6 to -9 (Burns
Supp. 1975). However, a statement would provide a more succinct, possibly time-saving
method of providing the trier of fact with tools for evaluation of the panel's conclusions.
One commendable aspect of the Act is the statutorily-mandated phrasing of the panel's
opinion. For example, the panel does not determine "negligence" but rather determines
whether the evidence "supports the conclusion that defendant or defendants failed to com-
ply with the appropriate standard of care .... " IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-7(a) (Burns Supp.
1975). Thus the panel is rendering only an opinion on facts, avoiding possible confusion
of the jury caused by opinions phrased in legal language. See McCormick, Some Observa-
ios Upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 Tex. L. REv. 109, 119-21 (1945).
An interesting question of a constitutional nature is whether a hearing by the Medical
Review Panel would be required prior to a diversity suit in federal court. Failure of the
federal courts to require panel review might encourage "forum-shopping." However, re-
quiring a hearing would subject an out-of-state plaintiff to scrutiny by a panel composed
entirely of the defendant's Indiana colleagues. For further analysis of state procedures in
federal courts, see C. WRIGHT, LAw oF FEDERAL CouRTs 241-47 (2d ed. 1970); 1A, Part 2,
J.W. Mooax, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTiCE 1 0.317[6] (1974); Markham v. City of Newport
News, 184 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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state interest.'" Attempts to characterize the right to sue for personal
injuries as a "vested property right'" 7 have failed, as have attempts
to find a fundamental "right of personal security and bodily integrity. '
Accordingly, the statute is subject only to the less stringent equal
protection test: whether the classification bears a rational relation to a
permissible state objective."0 9 In this regard the focus adopted by the
court is often important. If the court focuses upon the class of health
care providers, the reasoning of the Indiana Supreme Court in Chafin v.
Nicosia"' might well be conclusive. In Chaffin, the court considered
whether a two-year statute of limitations, applied only to malpractice,
created a "special privilege" in violation of the Indiana constitution."'
The court concluded that it did not, since:
If the situation, conditions, and circumstances of the persons included
within the class to which the law is made to apply so differ from
those of others not so included as to indicate the necessity of pro-
priety of making the law applicable only to those included within its
terms, and if the law is so framed as to apply to all to whom the
reason applies and to exclude all whom the reason excludes, it will
be deemed a general law. Such an act does not conflict with either
[the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution or article 1,
§ 23 of the constitution of Indiana]. 2
"oa Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, -, 271 N.E.2d 592, 601 (1973). If some funda-
mental constitutional right is infringed, the state must show a compelling governmental
interest to justify its action, and show as well that the means chosen to effect that interest
do not sweep unnecessarily broadly. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 527, 541 (1942).
107 See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Manzanares v. Bell,
214 Kan. 589, 609, 522 P.2d 1291, 1307-08 (1974); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271
N.E.2d 592 (1971). Cf. Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Kinney, 171 Ind. 612,
85 N.E. 954 (1909); Indianapolis Union Ry. v. Houlihan, 157 Ind. 494, 60 N.E. 943 (1901).
110 Ind. -, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974).
1' IN. CONsT. art. 1, § 23.
An equal protection attack was leveled against the Illinois no-fault automobile law in
Grace v. Howlett, 51 ll.2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). The unreported trial court deci-
sion may be found at 8 (1) TIAL 10 (1972). The Illinois statute set a ceiling on damages for
pain and suffering by limiting them to a set percentage of reasonable medical expenses. The
Illinois Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional on the basis that the law granted
a special privilege to drivers of private passenger automobiles in violation of a provision
of the Illinois constitution. The court criticized the statute not on the basis that vehicles
per se constituted an impermissible special class, but on the basis that private passenger
vehicles were insufficiently different from other conveyances to justify special legislative
treatment. The court noted that there was no reason why the recovery of a person in-jured by private passenger cars should differ from that of a person injured by other types
of vehicles. Because the Indiana statute includes all health care providers within its scope,
all persons injured by medical malpractice are equally subject to the Act's provision. Under
this char cterization the Act avoids the pitfalls of the Illinois law.
112 - Ind. at - , 310 N.E.2d at 869.
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If the classification created by the Malpractice Act is characterized as
one between medical tortfeasors and other tortfeasors, the Act appears
to meet this test. Medical injury litigation affects a critical and unique
segment of society. Medical services are a necessity and health care
providers are difficult to replace. Without some protection from suit,
health care providers may be tempted to avoid new but risky treatments,
to practice "defensive medicine," or not to render services at all."' In
order to encourage adequate medical care for the public, the legislature
may take special measures to protect the medical profession.
However, some courts have focused instead upon classifications of
tort victims for purposes of equal protection analysis. In Brown v.
Merlo,"' the court refused to recognize as valid a distinction between
the victim who happens to be a guest in an automobile and the victim
who is a paying passenger in an automobile. A similar victim-oriented
approach to equal protection was taken by a New York State trial court
which recently invalidated that state's "no-fault" automobile statute.
In Montgomery v. Daniels.," ' the court held that the classification cre-
ated by the statute was arbitrary and unreasonable, since:
There is further no rational reason why an individual who is injured
in tort other than an automobile may have access to the courts and
a person sustaining the same injury and effects in an accident involving
an automobile be barred therefrom, if the "serious injury" test require-
ment (the "threshold" requirement) is not met. This is true even where
the injuries sustained in each instance are identical, thereby assigning
a higher value to pain incurred from a fall on a "sidewalk highway"
than pain suffered in a motor vehicle accident." 6
From this victim-oriented perspective, the case for the constitu-
tionality of the Malpractice Act is weakened, since extensive damages
incurred by a malpractice victim are not easily distinguishable from
those incurred by victims of other torts. On the other hand, when one
considers the important public interest in maintaining the state health
care delivery system, and the threat which extensive damage litigation
represents, the Malpractice Act's special application to one group of
tort victims seems at least rational.
However, one classification created by the Malpractice Act raises
special equal protection concerns. The Act denies recovery to individ-
13See Carpenter v. Campbell, 149 Ind. App. 189, 271 N.E.2d 163 (1971).
114 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
11581 Misc. 2d 373, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1975), rev'd, No. 359 (Ct. App., N.Y.,
Nov. 25, 1975).
116 Id. at -, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
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uals whose damages, whether objectively identifiable or only subjectively
identifiable, exceed $500,000.' Failure to distinguish between objec-
tively identifiable medical costs on the one hand, and subjective injury
such as pain and suffering on the other hand, may render the damage
limitation overbroad.
Pain and suffering claims are less susceptible of objective proof
than are other damage claims and, correspondingly, more susceptible to
exaggeration." '8 Where legislation has as its chief aim the reduction
of the size of personal injury awards, it is possible that this aim might
be accomplished by a limitation only on pain and suffering damages
and not on objective damages as well. Were this true, a limit on both
sorts of damages might sweep too broadly. That there may be a signifi-
cant distinction between objective and subjective damages for equal
protection purposes is supported by some cases considering "no-fault"
statutes whose "threshold" provisions limit only the recovery of pain
and suffering damages. In Manzanares v. Bell,"9 the Kansas Supreme
Court observed that:
One of the obvious purposes of the Legislature in limiting recovery
under the threshold provision was clearly to eliminate minor claims
for pain and suffering. The Legislature could reasonably have thought
that the number of such cases . . .was largely connected with ex-
aggerated claims for pain and suffering in instances of relatively minor
injury.' 20
The court held that the legislature could have concluded that the evils
spawned by automobile pain and suffering litigation outweighed the
benefits derived in compensating victims who had, under the circum-
stances, suffered "no monetary loss."'' 2'
If the elimination of fraudulent recoveries were a legislative aim,
an absolute limit on recovery might sweep too broadly for this purpose.
Challenges to automobile "guest" statutes-which generally prohibit re-
covery for accident injuries by a guest in the defendant's automobile
unless the guest can prove a degree of misconduct greater than ordi-
nary negligence' 22 -offer some guidance in this regard. The California
Supreme Court recently struck down that state's guest statute as a vio-
lation of the equal protection guarantees of the California and federal
117 IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1975).
118 D. LOuiSELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 553 (1974).
1'9214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).
120 Id. at 610, 522 P.2d at 1309.
121 Id. at 611, 522 P.2d at 1309.
122 See Keasling v. Thompson, - Iowa , , 217 N.W.2d 687, 690 (1974).
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constitutions.' 3 The court observed that a principal reason for- the
guest statute was the protection of insurers against fraudulent lawsuits
arising out of collusion between host and guest. 2 ' However, the court
found that the California guest statute was a classic case of an "imper-
missibly overinclusive classification scheme," one which "reaches out
beyond the individuals tainted with the mischief at which a statute is
directed, and imposes its burden on innocent individuals who do not
share the condemning characteristics. '
Assuming that the elimination of exaggerated claims and recoveries
was one purpose behind the Malpractice Act,'26 the Act's damage limita-
tions may be similarly overinclusive. Although their claims may be' far
less susceptible to exaggeration than claims for pain and suffering, in-
dividuals with objectively identifiable economic losses may be denied
recovery beyond certain limits. To group together victims in this way,
without reference to the type of recovery sought, may fail "to exclude
all whom the reason excludes" 2 and may deny some malpractice vic-
tims the equal protection of the laws. '28
CONCLUSION
Certain provisions of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act may be
constitutionally objectionable. The Act's application to only a limited
class of tortfeasors and victims does not violate equal protection since
this classification is rationally related to the protection of the public
health. However, the damage limitation and the provisions governing
claims against the patients' compensation fund may be unconstitutional.
In strictly limiting the damages recoverable for malpractice, the
Act provides no "reasonable substitute" for the abrogated common law
right to recovery. Simply put, under the criteria developed in due
process challenges to "no-fault" and workmen's compensation statutes,
the Act does not otherwise reimburse plaintiffs for the damages they
are denied. However, it is not clear that due process in fact requires a
"reasonable substitute" for common law rights.
In denying recovery of damages in the most catastrophic circum-
stances, whether the damages are objectively identifiable or not, the Act
123 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
'
2 4 Id. at 873, 506 P.2d at 225, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
I's Id. at 876, 506 P.2d at 227, 106 CaL Rptr. at 403.
12 6 See Eleventh Draft of H.R. 1460 [on file with the IDIAxA LAW JoURNAL].
127 Chaffin v. Nicosia, - Ind. -, - , 310 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1974).
128 However, to apply the damage ceiling only to pain and suffering would still raise
a due process question. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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may be too sweeping in effect. If the goal of the legislation was to
eliminate artificially high damage recoveries, a limitation on pain and
suffering damages might have sufficed. Damages which are objectively
identifiable do not lend themselves to fraudulent claims, and perhaps
should have been excepted from the damage limitation.
Finally, the constitutional right to jury trial may be violated by
the provision that a judge will determine the damages to be recovered
from the patients' compensation fund. It is unclear whether a claim
against a state-created fund gives rise to a jury trial under the Indiana
constitution. 29 However, assuming that the constitutional right attaches
in the first place, the extent of damage poses a triable question of fact
which, subject only to a standard of reasonableness, was within the
province of the common law jury. To allow a judge to recompute the
damages may therefore be to invade the province of the jury.
However, constitutional doctrine plainly does not resolve the ques-
tion of the Act's validity. Although doctrine exists which would permit
a court to strike down certain provisions, this result is not compelled.
In a case where the Act is thought to produce an unusually harsh result,
on the other hand, constitutional weapons are available.
CATHRYN V. DEAL
129 See note 73 supra.
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